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Re-shifting Priorities: Replacing Latin America inside the European Union...
Can Mexico have membership in the European Union by the year 2020?
Nope. What about Chile, Brazil or Argentina? Not a chance. Too much
distance, too little influence. In any case, they all are American countries
(in the strict sense), have different priorities and belong to the US sphere of
influence. But, making a parallel, what would have been the answer had we
been asked the same thing about Poland, Czech Republic of Rumania
sixteen years ago, in 1988? I suspect the USSR would have been such an
international heavy-weight at the time that any suggestion of this kind
would have been pure speculation leading to a thick red wall. And yet,
there it is: this year ten countries – of what is loosely known as Eastern
Europe – finally realized a dream long searched for: to be part of a Union
that promise prosperity, peace and freedom. Yes, common geography and
history matters, but in an age of global exchanges, the dreams, ideas and
values of people play a big role too. After all it was Victor Hugo who
began this nonsense in the XIX century when claiming inside the French
Assembly for a United States of Europe. Why not launching support now
for a Euro-Latin Union in the XXII century?
Let’s get serious here and try to answer one single question: What is
going to be the place of Latin America for the European Union after 2004?
The answer implies both recognizing commonalities and differences in
projects and objectives between two contrasting regions. In both cases, my
main argument is that Latin America is to be ‘‘re-placed’’ inside Europe in
two contrasting ways: first, in the literal sense Latin America is going to be
replaced by the new Euro-agenda which has its own endogamic priorities;
secondly, Latin America will be re-placed in the sense of finding its own
new domain and status vis a vis the EU. We have to acknowledge that
Latin America has been in the interest of the EU, but only marginally. The
economic and financial agenda dominates the multilateral relations of co-
operation between the two regions. And this cooperation is asymmetrical
and uneven, structurally eroding the real possibilities if Latin America to
succeed in the global world. The III Summit of Guadalajara is a composite
of good intentions disguised in discourses that hide the real strings of power
and domination. It is clear that Spain, England and Germany will keep their
strong ties with the Latin American region and to a lesser extent Portugal,
France and Italy. But it is very unlikely that other EU countries, specially
the incoming ones, will have any incentive in expanding their interests to
Latin America in the short run.
1. LATIN AMERICAN SKETCH
Let me take the first question again: why should Mexico or any other
country in the Americas seek to join the EU? What would be the advan-
tages of such venture? In many ways, such political project means a geo-
graphical and historical inconsistency. Latin America, beginning in the
north with Mexico and ending in the south with Argentina, packs toget-
her around 30 countries with five different official languages mainly
(Spanish & Portuguese mainly, but also English, French and Dutch), 490
million people all in all. With around 20,000,000 square kilometers, its
net territory is roughly tree times the size of the European Union and
similar to North America (excluding Mexico, Central America and the
Caribbean). Shouldn’t the region try to integrate itself to gather the
potential powers of its natural resources, its common heritage and the
people in the first place? While this seems the logical step forward, for
those who know the intricacies of the region, the odds are against the
Latin Americans once again. The political will and economic structures of
domination of the Latin American elites – aligned to the US sphere of
influence – are the main obstacles to get the region beyond the meager
multilateral agreements among the countries. The initial question should
then be: Why can’t the Latin American countries build a prosperous
region together?
It is clear that academically speaking the main agenda for the region is
of social nature: development, education, and welfare. Then political: demo-
cracy, participation and corruption. And finally economic: growth, markets
and exchange. Of course, a combination of the three in their own momentos
is required. However the ideological neoconservative wave of the nineties
insisted in the Washington Consensus agenda: trade, commerce and business.
Oh, and a bit of democracy and development as a condiment... yes sir. The
results of not setting the right priorities straight have been unfortunate for
the region during the last fifteen years: increased unemployment rates, high
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social polarization, low education rates, modest economic growth, and a low
sense of justice given the current legal structure. Some of the consequences
of this basic formula are out there: high emigration, high criminality,
structural corruption and a sense that the novel democratic arrangements are
powerless to change anything.
Once the Cold War ended, Latin America hoped to build a different
relation with its mighty northern neighbor. Had Clifford Geertz been Latin
American, he would have had a hard time understanding the difference
between the US foreign political wink and twinkle. Towards the mid 90’s
President Clinton sent signals which made it difficult for the region to
clearly see what their place in the hemisphere was. On the one hand,
Clinton was committed to promoting the ALCA (Free Trade Area for the
Americas) and democracy development under the logic of the Washington
Consensus. On the other hand, the real structural factors that prevent freedom
and urgent social development to take place (i.e. foreign debt, poverty and
corruption) were ignored. US development aid to Latin America in the
nineties was limited, selective and precarious. US shifted priorities after
September 11 and Latin America became – once again – the forgotten
relation or the lost continent as Jorge Castan¨eda has argued. This may be
the reason of the increased attention being paid again to the EU by some
Latin American countries (2003a).
However, the real task for the region seems to be first to understand
why things have gone so wrong in recent years for the majority of the
people. The liberal-conservative argument is that the region is now more
democratic, has an increased integration with international markets and the
national product has modestly increased in the last years. They suggest that
the vast economic resources channeled through the seventies and eighties to
the region via public debt had been inefficiently used by financing public
spending – and not infrastructure and long term investment. They also point
out that the increase of the inefficient public sector was part of the failure,
along with lacking the legal and political rules to make competition and the
markets work (Zoellic 2003). What needs to be said, however, is that to
uncover the real structures of domination in the region, one need to look
into different sources: most of the billions of dollars given to the region by
the international financial institutions lacked the scrutiny, checks-and-balan-
ces, and social tags necessary to benefit society and control the often
dictatorial/authoritarian and corrupt governments of the times. A few other
consequences:
a) The Gini index in the region is among the worst in the world (the
top 10% of the Latin American elite engross 49% of the net wealth),
specially worse in the best 5 economies (Brazil and Mexico being the
epitome); (CEPAL 2002),
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b) The role of the dictatorial governments of the eighties has been
replaced by a group of authoritarian managers in the nineties (with little
concern for social demands and fully ignorant of the democratic welfare
state systems); and
c) The traditional tangible and intangible interventionist role of the United
States has contributed to underdevelop the social and political agenda in the
region, in favor of the economic benefit of their elites.
The classical economic prescription of the nineties for the region was to
impose a strict fiscal policy, eliminate social programs (many of them
labeled as unnecessary) and implement efficient tax systems. The state size
had to be squeezed by privatizing public institutions and services to make
the whole public sector more efficient – they argued – and attract foreign
direct investment to finance the infrastructure and the long term projects.
The idea was to encourage the region’s participation in the world markets
as the new development strategy. The market solution was the main presc-
ription. However, these strategies lacked the understanding of specific context
(history, social traditions and political practices) which led to pervasive and
inefficient privatizations, which many times ended up in the depredation of
the public sector. Just in Mexico, the privatization of the Bank system in
1990–92 gave the government public resources which had to be reinvested
five times over in 1997 after a bank crisis (FOBAPROA) of gigantic
dimensions, to rescue the financial system and the banker’s interests. There-
fore, the Public debt increased in the Latin American region from around
230 billions at the beginning of the eighties to almost 700 billions at the
end of the nineties. As a point of reference, the total external debt of the
developing world (or global south) was calculated to be of a trillion dollars
by 1992 (McMichael 2001: 165–67).
2. THE NEW AND WHOLE EUROPE IN A NUTSHELL
After the two catastrophic world wars of the first part of the XX century,
it would seem absurd to suggest that Europe would have any strength to
construct a common future towards the end of that same century. The
wounds were so painful, winners and losers were so confronted, the hatred
and memories were so profound that there was very little room for any
hope. The European nations were divided and torn against themselves. Out
of all that misery, Robert Schuman, Minister of Relations of France for-
mulated a project in 1950 which culminated in the Steel and Coal Com-
munity associating France, Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg
under a basic trade common project. Later on, in 1957 the Treaty of Rome
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signified European Community of the Six with a higher goal: free circulation
of goods, currency and people. Rather quickly, the original six-pack turned
into twelve and later into fifteen. This year ten countries from -the mis-
guidedly called- Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean joined the club
under a common Constitution and Parliament, a Euro-currency growing and
a dream for democratic institutions, prosperity and peace.
The Euro region changes its shape from the original fifteen and 376
million Europeans bringing in a ‘‘New Europe’’ of 77 millions inhabitants
more (a total of 453 millions compared to the 542 Latin Americans with
30 nations or 450 ‘‘North Americans’’ including Mexico, US and Canada
only). Clearly, this Euro-enlargement is the greatest in terms of inhabitants,
but also the poorest in economic grounds. Poland, a nation with over 40
million inhabitants, has an income per capita less than half the mean of the
fifteen European nations. A similar situation happens with the whole New
Europe: there are economic gaps to consider in the equation. Patience is
needed to reach the traditional welfare and standards of life of richer
Europe. It is necessary to take into consideration for example the Irish,
Greek, Spanish and Portuguese integration experiences which at the time of
their membership (1973, 1981 and 1986 respectively) already had around
60% of the European income per capita (Barry 2003: 897). And for most of
these nations, it took between 20 and 30 years to even up their European
mean in both income and levels of economic prosperity. The experiences of
the Eastern block with the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank in the eighties produced obvious failures: by the early 1990’s, Easter
European per capita income resembled those of the so called Third World.
The Per capita incomes of Poland and Mexico were about the same, as
were those of Hungary and Brazil (McMichael 2001: 160–161). And yet the
dilemma is there: how to launch an efficient take off for ten new economies?
Yes, the Euro-funds will arrive but the leaders of the new Euro-nations will
have to make an intelligent use of the resources and make sure they prompt
development. There is already a sense that if this process is not carefully
crafted, a growing mistrust may erupt on the side of the experienced
Euro-nations, under the simplistic archetypal accusations of wasting euro-
resources, disrupting fiscal regimes, promoting chaotic migration and cheap
floating labor, all of which leads into high national unemployment rates.
The challenge will remain if the EU can be a region of increasing equalities
among countries or if the Whole Europe will increase inequalities, making
the Union a two or three speed community.
Politically speaking the situation is more complicated. Even though the
domestic democratic institutions are on their way in most of the ‘‘New
European’’ nations, there are still authoritarian inertias, corrupt pulsations
and a lack of civic public life at the micro level which may hamper the
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track to a successful transition. Fragile parties, demagogical discourses and
poor participation in elections are not rare signs of these political disorders
inside the ten new nations. Clearly, a country like Poland requires advancing
their political reforms to make the democratic culture impregnate the civic
life of the nation, particularly in the rural areas and smaller towns, if for
example the traditional Sejmiki culture is to be eradicated. It is my impres-
sion that most of the New European nations require to come to terms with
their ideological past, making a critical review of their communist heritage,
to build a political identity coherent with the liberal times. The New Europe
has higher levels of education than those of Latin America, but the collapse
of their formerly comprehensive state subsidies and social consumption
quickly put their societies to the mercy of the market, leading to a ‘‘Third
Worldization’’ of their economies in the nineties. Ideally, the new Euro-
democracies would not make a simplistic rupture into rampant and innocent
liberalism (praising America’s freedom uncritically) but review their own
social principles to strengthen their communities in front of rapid changes.
In these sense, the Scandinavian nations can be seen as referent models of
a special kind: a blend of prosperity, freedom, democracy and social security
(cf. Rothstein 2001: 206–240).
The macro-political agenda is not easy neither. Even when Costas
Simitis – president in turn of the EU at the time of enlargement – ex-
pressed the goals and ambitions of the Union as a pole of peace, solidarity
and cooperation, with all the countries of the world, there are more
question marks than assertive answers regarding the future common political
project. The main problems seems to be the institutional design of the
Union, the new forms of participation and leadership and how to make
Brussels and the Euro-bureaucracy closer to the average European citizen.
The Euro-constitution approved in June still requires ratification – and
amendments – of the national parliaments. The European Council struggles
to make the multifunctional institutional arrangements work with ten new
members and France, England and Germany try to build consensus on
a continental classic leadership which sparks skepticism all over, specially
in the Scandinavian countries which cannot come to terms fully with
the Euro-currency. And the Bush US government cannot wait to fulfill
the apparent power empty space. The role of NATO and the global
security agenda are issues to be dealt with since the Euro-approach is
different from the American one, a gap especially evident during the
US Irak invasion in 2003 (Gordon 2003).
However, the agenda for the New Europe into the Whole Europe is of
social and cultural nature. How to bring the educational levels, health and
welfare programs into a common European standard? How to build a sense
of tolerance and social integration confronted with a rapid multicultural
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change? How to build a common Euro-identity when a Slavic majority,
a Maltese minority, and Greek-Cypriote group claim spaces among the
Estonians, the Russian-Latvians and the Hungarians? Not to mention the
Turk-Germans, the Algerio-French and the Indo-English Europeans. From
the 20 official languages accepted in the Union, only French English and
German are the institutional working languages, but English is without any
doubt the lingua franca of all. The assertions of a laic European institutional
life collide with questions from the Protestant, Catholic, Muslim and Jewish
communities who claim to be part of the cultural common European heritage,
and therefore, want to have more participation in the decision making
process. Do not forget the Vatican is a European nation with the Pope John
Paul II being the official head of state (Sberro 2004).
3. THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS REDUX
The last week of May 2004 we witnessed the III Summit of heads of
state of Latin America and the Caribbean with those of the European Union
in Guadalajara, Mexico. The purpose of the event was officially ‘‘to continue
with the dialogue for the setting up of multilateral agreements which will
allow development under the premise of a common project’’. This summit
is the successor of two previous gatherings, the Madrid II Summit in May
2002 and the First Rio de Janeiro Summit in June 1999 which left a Dec-
laration and a Plan of Action whose intentions are ‘‘to promote an strategic
bioregional association’’ under the assumption of common histories, cultures,
values and principles to build a common approach over the main international
issues. The official discourse stresses the interest in promoting a rich regional
dialogue to strengthen the multilateral institutions and international law as
the means for security, prosperity and international welfare. Clean and nice
(cf. SRE 2004). However, what are the real forces and interests behind
these discursive associations? What is the role of Latin America for the EU
after the 2004 enlargement? What are their new orientations and interests?
These seem to be the questions to ask when analyzing the two regions’
potential collaboration for the future.
A close reading of the official discourses shows that the phrases ‘‘social
cohesion’’ and ‘‘multilateralism’’ are essential components of the final
documents. The first concept is presented in a comprehensive manner,
including poverty relief, social and development policies, democratic gover-
nance, employment promotion, income redistribution, migration flows and
the role of regional integration. Multilateralism is seen as international
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security, peace promotion, the international financial system, external debt,
crisis prevention and cooperation for development in three topics: education,
culture and science and technology. The official documents also stress three
specific goals for the decade elaborating on the previous agenda as the
‘‘three dimensions of the strategic association’’: ‘‘political dialogue, economic
association and cooperation, and the State efforts to bring together the
international institutions, the private sector and the civil society’’. The key
‘‘Declaration of Trieste’’ on the eve of the entry of ten new countries into
the European Union, states that ‘‘the expansion process will present the
European Union with an opportunity to further develop with regard to the
national entities that support these relationships of friendship and cooperation
[...] contributing to a ‘‘New Europe’’ and to a ‘‘New Latin America’’, more
just, loyal and democratic, inspired by principles of tolerance, respect for
variety and living together in harmony’’ (SRE 2004b). Nice and clean
rhetoric again. Let’s take a closer look at the real material meaning and
purposes of these policies.
When discussing ‘‘social cohesion’’, most of the Latin Americans will
be suspicious about the term expressed through the discourses of the
elites. The idea is not all new for the less developed world – including
most of the less developed Europe. Most of the traditional societies know
that the only way to survive through restricted economic times is by
holding together with their families, friends and communities. This is
what they have learnt for decades, where ‘‘social cohesion’’ meant solidarity
and support in a sort of informal social net which operated as welfare
when the State and the private groups left them behind. The learnt lesson
is that nowadays the type of Summit Diplomacy rhetoric evades the
real issues by corrupting the language in strings of nice phrases which
mean very little in practical terms. The real fact is that the eighties
and nineties meant lost decades for most of the Latin American countries
and the beginning of the century does not look good neither. Just in
the nineties, the average GNP in the Latin American economies grew
by 2.3% in sharp contrast with 4.7% devoted to external debt payments.
Devaluations and inflation made it extremely difficult for the majority
to keep an income that allow them to fulfill their basic needs (CEPAL
2002). The question is of a different nature: Do the heads of State
of Europe and Latin America really have the intention of changing the
current dynamics which favor their own elites, the interest of the financial
organizations and the logic of the domination that Great Powers continue
to impose?
My impression of Latin American side is that the European Union is
doing very little to change anything positive on the other side of the Atlantic.
And in fact, a political claim can be made that in real terms the EU policies
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are taking advantage of the region’s vulnerability, in association with the
weak leadership of their politicians under a restrictive neoconservative
agenda. The EU is the first world power when it comes to commerce since
around 40% of the exports and imports go through them in comparison with
the second pole, the US with around 25% (WTO 2004). EU influence on
international organizations (such as World Bank, IMF and the World Trade
Organization, where it holds around 27% of the votes) is essential but their
practices keep a constant conservative tone: the broad consensus that their
abusive agricultural subsidies are in contradiction with the ideological
prescriptions to the rest of the world, is usually overlooked. McMichael
develops a similar argument when he claims that Global Governance is
a sort of control of the weaker countries by the stronger regions (cf.
McMichael 2001: 147–235).
Therefore, even when a ‘‘transatlantic market’’ project sounds good and
fine in principle, it is essential to reconsider the real differentials between
the two regions (if Latin America is to be considered at all). There is no
doubt that the language used by Pascal Lamy as the head of EU commercial
interests insists on a ‘‘Global Governance’’ through commercial agreements
and International Institutions such as the WTO. And this agenda is part of
what has been termed as the ‘‘Transatlantic Unitary Market’’ which was
discussed on the EU-USA 2004 Summit in Ireland. The key figure is the
commercial participation between the two regions (Europe-America) which
at the beginning of the decade is close to nothing: for Europe, Latin
America represents only 2.2% of the net exports and 2.2% of the imports.
The difference with North America is sharp: around 25% of the exports and
21% of the imports to and from the EU, with a total trade volume of
$557,146 billion dollars in the nineties (Hufbauer et al. 2002). This is an
indication of the poor economic relevance of the Latin American region for
the interests of European capitals. The real strategic plan of the EU is to
maintain an aggressive agenda of economic liberalism which is highly
selective and unequal in terms of the quality of the exchanges, not to
mention their lack of social concern for other regions, including Latin
America. To provide an example, the EU leadership in trade has been
vociferous in promoting the Singapore agenda, well known for its emphasis
on the protection of the interests of foreign investors, the participation of
firms in government affairs via privatization, and the liberalization of the
entire service sector for all the WTO members. There is an obsession in
their discourse with diminishing the social role of the State, making every-
thing inside the public sector a simple commodity. In the same tone, the
Lisbon Agenda has as its main purpose the construction of the greatest
economic space in the world in a decade, under the rules of ‘‘competition’’,
which translates in the erosion social and political agreements, vital to the
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Communitarian Foundational Pact (European Commission 2004). What I am
trying to show is that there is little consistency between the discourses
presented in Guadalajara and the one-way profit oriented practices the EU
leadership imposes on the rest of the world via the international organiza-
tions. What is then ‘‘social cohesion’’?
When it comes to cooperation the situation is not so different. Perhaps the
most pervasive problem for Latin America is the size of the external debt
which paralyzes all possibilities of constructive development. Nowadays Latin
America is the greatest debtor of the world with close to 790 billion dollars,
which accounts for 32% of the net Third World debt (US $2,450 billion
dollars) in 2001 (NOTIMEX 2002). At the beginning of December 2002 the
headings of many newspapers in Latin America had bad news from the region
according to SELA: ‘‘Latin America pays in external debt more the net sum
that USA devoted to reconstruct Europe after the war’’. While some of the
numbers can be discussed further, the conclusion would be similar: 76 billion
dollars were channeled out from Latin America to pay for the debt service
between 1990 and 2001. This accounts for 912 billion dollars at that time
which is more than the net sum f the whole foreign debt as expressed before.
And it comes as no surprise that the EU is the greatest creditor for Latin
America with close to 41% of the total (having US as a ‘‘second best’’). The
payments for the external debt for most of the countries of Latin America is
around 12 percent of their GNP which accounts in most of the cases for the
total sum devoted to education, health and shelter, i.e. social programs (World
Bank 2002). The composition of the debt has also changed in its substance:
nowadays the net debtors are mainly private banks (76% in 2000), then
bilateral and finally by the financial organizations. The change from having
mainly a multilateral debt (IMF, WB, etc.) to a private and bilateral one has
taken place in twenty years and for Latin America this shift has been a part of
the liberal policies of the nineties which emphasized the privatization of the
bank system. The Latin American national bank system has been swept away
by mainly Spanish, French, German, American and Japanese firms with all the
financial implications for the domestic policies. Just in the case of Mexico,
94% of the bank system is in the hands of foreign investors by the year 2004,
mainly European (60 percent of the total) and American. The counterbalance
is peculiar: the EU devotes 0.2% for development support into the region
which traduces in 2 billion dollars (ODA). A sharp contrast with the 30 billion
dollars plus sent to the European creditors per year from the Latin American
governments (Hernández 2004). What kind of cooperation are the leaders
gathered at Guadalajara talking about? Let’s keep in mind that this is a history
of challenges where Latin America is far behind Europe and their own
priorities are not clearly recognized by the world leaders in the two regions.
A concrete comparative example of the differences I am suggesting can be
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seen through welfare development. Europe has enjoyed for decades a relative
strong and comprehensive group of social services in the forms of health,
education, and housing, not to mention the unemployment insurance that
has been part of the different welfare models. Even with the EU enlargement,
the region enjoys the strongest social security in the planet. For example, in
the health sector Sweden invests $2,270 US per capita, where 85% comes
from the public sector. This guarantees a universal comprehensive healthcare
system in a nation of 8.9 million inhabitants. A basic comparison with
Mexico, one of the more advanced welfare models in Latin America shows
that investment is healthcare is $526 US per capita ($629 US for Poland)
and only 45% of the total investment comes from the public sector (72%
for Poland), which makes the protection for the 100 million people both
inefficient and expensive (OECD 2003). The reflexion I am suggesting here
is that a realistic collaboration between the two regions should emphasize
social and political aspects of the cooperation (and not only commercial)
where Europe can actually influence the norms and practices of the public
policies of countries in Latin America.
The commercial agreements between the EU and Mexico and later Chile
are important pieces to understand the dynamic of domination disguised as
cooperation. The two countries are hemispheric leaders with relative strong
economies who are also integrated into the North American Free Trade
Agreement, with US and Canada. Their economic reforms and the liberalization
of their markets have been presented as models for the region. Mexico has
opened its markets widely and is, just as Chile, one of the countries with more
free trade agreements in the world. However, the macro figures (the triadic
formula of strict fiscal policy, low inflation, high FDI) do not mach with the
social results expressed earlier. The two former authoritarian regimes have
struggled to match the preconditions established by the developed economies in
order to be taken seriously as a business partner, but the affluence remains in
the elites and the wealth does not trickle down to the rest of the society. And it
will never do if the structures of power and domination remain. Just in Mexico,
the poverty line has increased in the last ten years (liberal times) to 50% of the
population in conservative terms and in Chile to 42%. It is perhaps useful to
take a look at the Scandinavian example – their economies have managed to
become fully global but at the same time emphasize wide social concerns. Most of
them show exemplar outcomes when measured in human development terms, social
satisfaction and ecological concerns. Bo Rothstein mentions that the point of the
social democratic welfare state in the Nordic region is the focus on the creation of
social capital, seen as a primia facie of any well-functioning democratic development
(2001). In other words, Latin America cannot aspire to become a truly democratic
region if there is no investment in the social capital of education, health and
community participation.
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A concrete comparative example of the lack of social capital in the
form of democratic values can be seen through the Latin-barometer’s and
the Euro-barometer’s results. In the years 1999–2000 people from the
regions were asked about their support for and their satisfaction with
democracy. The Latin-barometer, comprising 17 countries in the region
showed that 56% of the populations of these nations supported democ-
racy as the best form of government and 32% of the population was
actually satisfied with the results democracy had brought to them in
their everyday business. When compared to Europe (EU members 2000),
the figures went for 78% and 53% respectively. Now, when these figu-
res were compared with what was known as the ‘‘New democracies
barometer’’, or a comprise of nine nations associated with the former
USSR, the numbers showed 53% and 29% respectively, much closer to
those of the Latin-barometer (Opinio´n Pública Latinoamericana
1996–2000). What is this sign of? I am suggesting here that in some
respects, countries associated with the USSR in the Cold-war seem to be
much closer in their beliefs to democracy to the Latin-American states
than the whole EU, in part because the promises of the new emerging
democratic governments have found it very difficult to overcome the
historic burdens encountered along the road, but also because the EU
and other advanced nations (such as Japan, Australia and the USA) have
failed to meet their cooperation promises to facilitate realistic democratic
transitions to take place.
Taking into consideration the disturbing social and economic differences
worldwide, yet the global times get us closer than ever, and now it is
potentially easier to find out basic facts about each other. Or it should be
the case. In this scenario it is possible to testify that in many ways people
from Latin America and the New Europe have participated in similar global
roles until recently: as economic emigrants, as financial debtors, and tradi-
tional cultural producers. This may be a point of reference for the New
Europe into the whole EU. As Edward Said reminds us ‘‘The worldly
context remains both perplexingly stirred-up and ideologically fraught,
volatile, tense, changeable, and even murderous. Even though the Soviet
Union has been dismembered and the East European countries have attained
political independence, patterns of power and dominance remain unsettlingly
in evidence. The global South – once referred to romantically and even
emotionally as the Third World – is enmeshed in a debt trap, broken into
dozens of fractured or incoherent entities, beset with problems of poverty,
disease and underdevelopment that have increased in the past ten or fifteen
years’’ (Said 1978: 128). These are the issues left aside in the Summit of
Guadalajara agenda. Issues that will have an impact on how we can change
the future for good in the next few years.
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We have to acknowledge that Latin America has been in the interest of
the EU, but only marginally. And in fact, during the recent years the EU
integration with some of the Eastern European countries has made it
complicated for the two colossal regions to see themselves face to face. It
is clear the circumstances have shifted. Now EU is no longer a union of
fifteen members but 25 – with Bulgaria, Rumania, Turkey and another few
more expecting an opportunity for a membership in the near future. And the
challenges to integration are great already as for the Whole EU to be
concerned with expanding their interests to the region. It is clear that Spain,
England and Germany will keep their strong ties with the Latin American
region and to a lesser extent Portugal, France and Italy. But it is very
unlikely that other EU countries, specially the incoming ones, will have any
incentive in expanding their interests to Latin America in the short run.
CONCLUSIONS: REGIONAL DILEMMAS AND PARADOXES
This fast overview of the dilemmas of cooperation between Latin America
and the EU in relation to Enlargement can be summarized in three basic
arguments: the institutional channels and the discursive practices among the
two regions, the real shifting of priorities for the EU and the ‘‘too little too
conservative’’ political and normative approach. The good news is that between
the EU and Latin America there is a good and functional institutional dialogue
in the form of institutions, ministerial meetings, common agendas and commer-
cial exchanges. The bad news for Latin America is that in the last twenty
years the connections between the two regions have not increased in the
socio-political side as much as in the commercial and economic planes, filling
the in-between with an assortment of declarative and unsubstantial diplomatic
discourses. This is in part due to the much more conservative political view of
the EU when it comes to getting closer to an area of interest traditionally left
to the USA, but it is also a sign of a more neo-liberal economic agenda set
inside the EU the last few years. The other bad news for Latin America is that
there is indication on the side of the EU that their main efforts to spark
realistic democratic arrangements and economic development are going to be
focused inside the EU within the new family members (vis a vis Enlargement).
In this way, the ‘‘Latin American agenda’’ is likely to be re-placed by
urgencies of the new EU members, not to let alone the internal EU contradic-
tions of the multilevel-mega-organization itself, evident in its own constitution
or the common currency. In sum, the forecast for the political and social
cooperation between the two regions is likely to be rhetorical and thin, but the
commercial side can continue to be ‘‘normal’’, i.e. irrelevant in global terms.
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To wrap up my conclusion I suggest there are two regional paradoxes in
the cooperation between the Enlarged-EU and Latin America: the first one is
political and the second one is socio-cultural. The European Union seems to
be enjoying a clear conservative and dogmatic view of politics, where most
of the current governments inside the Union belong to niche center-right
ideologies, driven by their inclination to cut on social programs, use the
nationalist and anti-immigration card when necessary, and see politics ‘‘as
market functions’’. At the same time, Latin America comes from a twenty
year neo-liberal fatigue, which has forced the dismantling of the minimal
welfare arrangements existing in most of the countries, thus increasing the
social tensions. The result in the last five years has been a shift in the vote
of these fragmented and underdeveloped democratic electors, from a traditio-
nal view of politics to a pioneering exploration of the social and left-
democratic parties. You can see the shift in Brazil, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Peru, Argentina, Chile, and soon perhaps even Mexico. The new center-left
governments are going against fundamentalist economic orthodoxy and
increasing social spending, nationalizing some industries back again and
creating programs for vulnerable sectors of society. Good luck. A regional
political paradox.
The second paradox is much more cultural and has to do with real
visions of the two societies. It is hardly believable the minimal understanding
that the two regions have of each other in cultural terms. When it comes to
their societies, the two regions know each other very little. Both the EU
and Latin American societies have many stereotypes and social mythologies
which do not allow them to be more interconnected, both at levels of high
politics and trade as well as that of the ‘‘common people’’. As we know in
academia, the mechanisms to get a closer understanding of ‘‘the other’’ pass
through a series of norms and ideas, such as democracy, human rights and
fair trade, but also support for higher levels of education, health and income
distribution. After all, we are occidental nations with a diversity of values,
but occidental anyways. I suggest that perhaps we can try to concentrate
less on unsubstantial rhetoric and focus on the realistic issues and problems
that concern people and their communities. The regions must negotiate for
a common future. Latin America and Europe share common traditions that
should be an advantage to grow and achieve greater global welfare. If we
manage to do so, the Europeans will realize their dream of being an
unparalleled community of 25 firm democracies living in peace, prosperity,
social understanding and freedom, and the Latin Americans may bring their
own understanding of the same objectives, adding up to a global prosperous
common future. Hard to realize, but not impossible.
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